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What Bonds Hold? 
An Examination of Statewide Bond Referenda in Maine and Other States 
by James P. Melcher
Since 1990, Maine has held votes on statewide bond referenda than any other state. In this article, James Melcher 
tackles three main questions: (1) How often do voters approve bond proposals in Maine, and how does this compare 
to other states? (2) Are some types of bond referenda more likely to pass than others? (3) Does a bond’s placement 
on the ballot make it more, or less, likely to pass?
Several times a decade, Maine and other states hold 
a variety of votes on statewide issues. Typically, the initia-
tives and referenda that draw the most attention are votes 
on controversial issues such as bear hunting, same-sex 
marriage, and gun control. But another type of statewide 
referendum vote, while usually less controversial and 
little publicized, can have great importance for a state’s 
finances and its ability to fund a variety of long-range 
projects: statewide bond referenda. There is no better 
opportunity for voters to shape how their states spend 
their tax dollars. These elections have received relatively 
little attention from the media and from scholars alike. 
So, this article will address the following questions: 
1. How often do voters approve bond proposals 
in Maine, and how does this compare to other 
states? 
2.  Are some types of bond referenda—say, trans-
portation bonds—more likely to pass than are 
others? 
3. Does the spot on the ballot in which a particular 
bond appears make it more, or less, likely to pass? 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
There has not been much research on statewide bond elections, but related issues have been studied exten-
sively. For instance, there has been extensive research 
over the past 50 years on local bond elections, espe-
cially school bond elections. Edward Muir and Krista 
Schneider published the most widely cited scholarly 
article on statewide bond referenda in 1999, which 
examined statewide bond referenda from 1980 to 1990. 
They found that 75 percent of the bonds in that period 
passed and there appeared to be a trend of increased 
support for such referenda, which received an average 
of 56 percent of the vote. Their other findings included 
decreased support for any given initiative the more such 
issues appeared on the ballot and that certain types 
of referenda outperformed others. Bonds supporting 
health and human services, followed by transportation 
bonds, received the highest share of the vote, with a 
whopping 97 percent of health and human services 
bonds passing. In contrast, bonds for parks and historic 
preservation, along with bonds for judicial and correc-
tional facilities, fared the worst, with passage rates close 
to 50 percent. Another study by Leslie McGranahan 
(1998) covering statewide bond referenda from 1968 to 
1998 offers similar findings, both on the overall success 
rate of bond passage and on the types of bonds that are 
more likely to win. 
Importance of Ballot Order
There has not been much research on ballot order 
and bond elections. The order in which candidates, 
parties, or issues appear on a ballot may seem trivial to 
the casual observer. However, fears of being disadvan-
taged by an unfavorable spot on the ballot, or concerns 
that election officials did not act properly, have led to 
many lawsuits in recent years in several states. Although 
the public might pay little attention to the controversy 
of ballot order, political scientists have been studying it 
since the 1920s. Many studies argue that first place on 
the ballot has a small positive effect on vote share in a 
MAINE POLICY REVIEW  •  Vol. 25, No. 2  •  2016      54
BOND REFERENDA IN MAINE AND OTHER STATES
variety of elections, especially in races with large fields, 
nonpartisan races, or races with high turnout (Chen et 
al. 2014; Meredith and Salant 2011). Other research 
claims that the candidates listed last on the ballot may 
have an advantage similar to that enjoyed by the candi-
dates who are listed first (Koppell and Steen 2004).
Although research on ballot order has not been 
conducted for statewide bond referenda, research offers 
some clues about what we might expect. The effects of 
ballot order are more likely to appear in primary elec-
tions than in general elections, in part because voters do 
not get to separate candidates out by party label in these 
races (Koppell and Steen 2004). Similarly, nonpartisan 
races are also more likely to see ballot-order effects 
(Alvarez, Sinclair, and Hasen 2006). In both primary 
elections and nonpartisan races, voters are responding to 
electoral choices in which they lack the information and 
partisan cues that are available in a more visible race with 
candidates for president or governor on the ballot. Since 
bond referenda often do not provide much information 
for voters and are always nonpartisan, they are exactly the 
type of race in which ballot-order effects would be rela-
tively likely. Unlike a crowded primary field where voters 
usually are asked to choose one candidate from a list of 
many, in state bond referenda voters are usually asked to 
make one choice after another to approve spending 
money on a series of bond packages. Just as a parent 
might finally say “no” to the fourth request by a child for 
a favor, voters may do likewise and be more likely to say 
“no” to the bond referenda lower on the ballot.
In Maine, initiatives are given higher numbers 
(e.g., “Issue 1”) than referenda, so bond referenda are 
always listed on the ballot after initiatives. According 
to a press release by the Maine Secretary of State’s 
Office (August 30, 2013), “Maine law…requires the 
questions to be organized on the ballot by category as 
follows: people’s veto questions first, then citizen initia-
tives, followed by bond questions, referendum ques-
tions proposed by the Legislature, and finally, resolutions 
to amend the state Constitution.”
Expectations about Maine
What should we expect to find about state bond 
elections in Maine? We would expect, above all, that 
most bonds would pass. Furthermore, the research on 
other types of elections would suggest that ballot-order 
effects would be relatively likely to appear in statewide 
bond elections. In most cases, these elections are 
low-visibility races, overshadowed by campaigns up 
the ticket, and like most nonpartisan elections, they 
are lower-information races than partisan ones. 
Additionally, transportation bonds in Maine have had 
a reputation as hard to beat (Russell 2013; Goble 
2013), so we can expect that will be the case in this 
study. As a Bangor Daily News (December 18, 2009) 
editorial noted, “people intuitively understand that 
commerce relies on strong transportation links; that’s 
why transportation bond requests almost always win 
approval at the polls.” 
Timing of Bond Referenda
Research shows that school bond votes do better 
when major election choices (president, governor, US 
senator) are not on the ballot because motivated school 
supporters turn out even when the big races are not on 
the ballot. One study found that school bond referenda 
passed at a rate almost 20 percentage points higher in 
odd years (when major elections are not on the ballot) 
than in even years (when major races are more likely on 
the ballot) (Meredith 2009).
Why Do Bonds Tend to Pass? 
Unlike ballot initiatives, which may reflect the 
position of a vocal minority, Maine state bonds must 
be approved by a supermajority of both legislative 
houses, with further authorization needed by the 
governor in some cases. This suggests that bonds 
already enjoy a broad level of support even before they 
get on the ballot. Another key reason for bond success 
is that backers of a particular bond referendum typi-
cally organize and campaign to publicize their cause. 
Unlike nearly all other types of elections, however, 
statewide bond referenda seldom spur organized 
opposition. 
Maine Compared to Other States
In the period from 1990 through 2014, Maine held 
more votes on statewide bonds than any other state. 
Why? First, most other states have constitutional hurdles 
in place as a check on state borrowing and bonding. 
…bonds already enjoy a  
broad level of support even  
before they get on the ballot.
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These have been common since the Panic of 1837, which 
left many states unable to pay off bonds that they had 
issued in large numbers following New York’s success 
with its bond-supported Erie Canal project. In 1842, 
Rhode Island became the first state to put limits on state 
bonding in its constitution (McGranahan 1998). 
Additionally, many states use other means besides public 
approval to limit bonding such as limiting guaranteed 
debt to a percentage of a certain dollar amount (for 
example, a percentage of state tax revenue). While 
current data are difficult to find, as of 1996, only 20 
other states featured statewide bond referenda (Kiewiet 
and Szakaly 1996). Maine has long been a leader in 
offering a relatively high number of bond referenda. 
McGranahan (1998) found that Maine accounted for 
20.1 percent of all statewide bond referenda between 
1968 and 1988; Maine was a part of a group of five states 
in that era (which includes California and Rhode Island, 
two states discuss later in this article) that accounted for 
almost 80 percent of all state bond referenda. 
Another reason for Maine’s large share of statewide 
bond referenda is that the Maine Constitution sets a 
relatively low threshold for requiring voter approval for 
bonds. Maine general obligation bonds that borrow 
more than $2 million require public approval (except 
under unusual circumstances). The constitutional limit 
on Maine state borrowing was raised to $2 million in 
1934, and until 1950, the only way Maine could borrow 
more than that was to amend its Constitution. Several 
measures that passed in Maine during the first half of 
the twentieth century that look like modern bond refer-
enda were actually state constitutional amendments. 
(Some states—Alabama, for example—still pass bonds 
by passing a constitutional amendment for each one.) 
Concerns about constitutional clutter led to an amend-
ment of Article IX, Section 14 of the Maine State 
Constitution in 1950. Now, to borrow more than $2 
million, a supermajority (two-thirds of both houses) of 
the legislature (after negotiating the details of the bond 
packages with the governor) must pass the package, 
which then goes to approval by voters. A simple majority 
is required for passage by the voters (Tinkle 2013). 
THE STUDY
The best state for comparing bond referenda to Maine is Rhode Island, partly because Rhode 
Island has among the highest number of statewide bond 
referenda in recent years and because it is the only other 
New England state that holds bond referenda. I have 
identified all 379 cases of bond referenda in the United 
States between 1990 and 2014 and compared the 
winning percentages of the nation as a whole to Maine 
and Rhode Island. The question, then, is, Will these two 
states be typical of the rest of the nation, or will they be 
outliers not just in how often they vote on bond refer-
enda, but on how they vote on them, too? 
This article presents information on bond referenda 
elections that authorized new spending in Rhode Island 
and Maine from 1990 to 2014 and basic data about the 
outcomes of statewide bond elections nationally from 
that same period. The article also examines the proposi-
tion that ballot position may play a role in victory (in 
particular that being listed first may be advantageous). 
Finally, the paper examines whether certain types of 
bond referenda (particularly transportation bonds) 
experience greater success than other types of bonds. 
THE NATIONAL PICTURE
I compiled every statewide referendum issuing specific bonds from 1990 to 2014, as listed on National 
Council of State Legislatures’ Ballot Measures Database.1 
During that period, 25 states held a total of 379 state-
wide bond referenda (Table 1). 
This average of 79.2 percent represents a slightly 
higher percentage of victory than in the Muir and 
Schneider (1999) research, which found that 76 percent 
of the 319 statewide bond votes passed between 1978 
and 1990. (However, they also predicted that based on 
recent bond referendum success, the rate of bond victory 
was likely to go up in the future). 
Maine and Rhode Island held more bond referenda 
over this period than any other states (with California in 
third place). Both Maine and Rhode Island have low 
thresholds for issuing statewide bonds without voter 
approval ($2 million and $4 million, respectively), so in 
Maine has long been a leader  
in offering a relatively high  
number of bond referenda.
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other states a bond may not require a referendum. 
Maine and Rhode Island are not necessarily borrowing 
more money than other states or even more money per 
capita; rather, they are seeking voter approval more 
often because they have to do so. In fact, Kiewiet and 
Szakaly (1996) found that states that require state bond 
approval take on a smaller percentage of debt than states 
that borrow money with other procedures. 
California: The Big Outlier in Bond Elections 
While Maine and Rhode Island have held more 
bond referenda over the past 24 years than other states, 
the percentages of the bonds approved in these two 
states are close to both each other and the average of the 
other states, with all three figures clustering around 80 
percent. By contrast, the chief outlier among the states 
with enough cases from which to make inferences is 
California, which has passed bond referenda at a rate 
about 20 percentage points lower than the other 25 
states. Why? The biggest reason is California’s bond 
elections commonly have two features not common in 
other states: bonds that come attached to major policy 
changes and counterinitiatives, a practice in which 
“business groups and issue activists increasingly propose 
alternative initiatives to counter those they oppose” 
including bonds (Kruse 2001: 142). A good example 
featuring both phenomena was “Big Green,” a major 
environmental bond and policy change which gained 
only 35.7 percent of the vote in a heated, expensive 
contest in 1990 (Skelton 1990). 
Like most states, Maine and Rhode Island place 
bonds with a limited focus on the ballot. The bonds do 
not introduce new policies; they simply request money 
for a particular category of projects. As such, there is 
relatively little incentive for groups to oppose these votes 
because they offer either incremental change or money 
to maintain the status quo. It is unlikely that the 
California trend of mixing bonds with other policy 
proposals will be seen in Maine and Rhode Island. 
BOND ELECTIONS IN RHODE ISLAND
Since 1990, Rhode Island has held elections to autho-rize 68 different bond proposals for new spending. 
Unlike Maine, Rhode Island’s bond referenda are only 
held during November general elections in even-num-
bered years, ensuring a relatively high turnout compared 
to elections held at other times. Like other states, Rhode 
Island has passed the most proposed bonds: 54 of the 
68 bonds in this period passed (79.4 percent). Although 
this percentage is high, it may understate the current 
probability of bond passage in the Ocean State because 
it includes a period in which numerous bonds were 
defeated. These defeats were most pronounced in 1992 
when four of the five bonds on the ballot were defeated; 
three of those four did not even reach 40 percent 
support. Across the elections of 1992, 1994, and 1996, 
eight bonds won and nine were defeated. Since then, 
Table 1 Success or Failure of Statewide Bond  
 Referenda by State, 1990–2014
State Win Lose
Percentage 
passing
Maine 84 19 81.6
Rhode Island 54 14 79.4
Alabama 7 0 100.0
Alaska 7 0 100.0
Arizona 1 0 100.0
Arkansas 6 0 100.0
California 41 26 61.2
Colorado 1 2 33.3
Hawaii 7 1 87.5
Louisiana 1 0 100.0
Michigan 2 0 100.0
Missouri 3 1 75.0
Nevada 3 0 100.0
New Jersey 12 2 85.7
New York 3 1 75.0
New Mexico 29 5 85.3
North Carolina 5 0 100.0
Ohio 8 2 80.0
Oregon 0 1         0  
Pennsylvania 2 0 100.0
Texas 19 2 90.5
Utah 0 1         0  
Virginia 2 0 100.0
Washington 1 1 50.0
West Virginia 2 1 66.7
ME/RI 139 32 81.3
Others 162 46 77.9
TOTAL 300 77 79.2
(N=379)
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only five statewide bond votes have lost in Rhode 
Island, with a bond passage record of 39 (wins) to 4 
(losses) (90.5 percent). Only one statewide bond has 
been defeated in Rhode Island since 2006, and that one 
defeated bond—a $4 million bond to “restore, improve 
and expand recreational facilities at the Fort Adams 
State Park in Newport” (Winograd 2006)—received 
49.4 percent of the vote. 
Why did Rhode Island have such a tough period for 
bond votes in the early 1990s? First, the national 
economy soured after 1991. Second, at that time Rhode 
Island voters had extra cause to be skeptical of new 
government spending for three reasons: recent govern-
ment corruption and abuse of power; Rhode Island’s 
high level of per capita debt; and criticism of bond 
spending by a prominent business group (Donovan 
1994; Jones 1992). Also, in 1990, Rhode Island voters 
passed the highest amount of debt in bond referenda in 
the state’s history ($197 million), which may have made 
voters in the next two elections hesitant to add more 
(Garland 1996).
BOND ELECTIONS IN MAINE
From 1990 to 2014, Maine held statewide refer-enda on 103 proposed bonds. Of these, 84 bonds 
(81.6 percent) won. Unlike Rhode Island, Maine can 
hold bond elections at any time of year. While many 
of Maine’s bond referenda are held in November 
of even-numbered years, they are more common in 
November general elections in odd-numbered years. 
The timing of these elections matters because refer-
endum supporters—who are particularly motivated to 
show up—are advantaged when elections are held when 
other voters are less likely to vote. Examples include 
non-November elections, when primary elections are 
being held, and in odd-numbered years, when candi-
dates for president and governor are not on the ballot 
(Anzia 2011).
Presidential election years in Maine, as elsewhere, 
draw the most voters, followed by gubernatorial general 
election years, with other election years well behind. 
The people who vote in these nongeneral elections differ 
from those who turn out for more publicized races, 
which might help bond referenda do better in such 
races. Following this theory, we would expect that bond 
referenda in Maine do best in elections without a 
general election, followed by in November elections 
when there is no general election for president or 
governor, then by gubernatorial general elections, and 
finally presidential election years. Table 2 shows that 
this tends to be in the case.
Since 1989, Rhode Island has only held statewide 
bond referenda in November general elections in 
even-numbered years (Garland 1996), but the pattern is 
similar to Maine’s: a slightly higher level of success for 
gubernatorial year votes (27–5, 84.4 percent) than for 
presidential year votes (28–8, 77.8 percent). Table 3 
adds Rhode Island bond numbers to Table 2. 
So while bond elections held at any time are likely 
to succeed, they win more often as turnout goes down 
from higher-participation elections to lower ones. 
Winning Bond Issues 
Maine shows similar patterns in its statewide bond 
elections to Rhode Island. In both states, most types of 
bonds have a high winning percentage and a high 
average percentage of the vote. Table 4 presents bonds 
divided into several basic types and listed in descending 
Table 2:  Success of Maine Bond Referenda  
 by Month and Type of Election Year, 
 1990–2014
Month Won–lost
Percentage 
winning
November, presidential  
election year
10–5  (N=15) 66.7
November, gubernatorial  
election year
20–8  (N=28) 71.4
November, neither 39–7  (N=46) 84.8
January or June 15–0  (N=15) 100.0
Table 3: Success of Bond Referenda in  
 Maine and Rhode Island by Month  
 and Type of Election Year
Month Won–lost
Percentage 
winning 
November, presidential  
election year
38–13  (N=51) 74.5
November, gubernatorial  
election year
47–13  (N=60) 78.3
November, neither 39–7  (N=46) 84.8
January or June 15–0  (N=15) 100.0
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order of frequency: natural resources (purchase of public 
lands, environmental protection, water quality); trans-
portation; education; economic development; arts and 
history (such as historic preservation projects for historic 
buildings); state facilities (such as rehabbing current 
state office buildings, prison construction, personnel 
training); health (such as state support for construction 
at medical research facilities); public housing; and agri-
culture. 
Table 4 shows just how well most types of bond 
referenda did at the polls, but at the same time confirms 
Muir and Schneider’s (1999) observation that voters are 
sensitive to the type of bond they are approving. Work 
on state buildings, for example, proved unpopular in 
both states. In the 1990s, each state soundly rejected 
bonds that would have renovated state buildings to 
bring them into compliance with Occupational Health 
and Safety Administration (OSHA) regulations. 
Additionally, votes for building at correctional facilities 
also fared badly. 
Transportation Bonds 
Transportation bonds have a reputation as being the 
most bulletproof bonds in Maine. Transportation bonds 
in Maine and Rhode Island were victorious 90 percent of 
the time and had the highest average percentage of the 
vote (63.9 percent). Yet, Table 4 shows that other catego-
ries of bonds also perform well (education, natural 
resources, economic development, and health). 
Why is this? First, nearly all bonds perform well 
under normal circumstances, so it is hard for one type 
to appear distinctively successful when the overall 
average success rate hovers around 80 percent. The case 
of the three failed transportation bonds, however, is a 
good example of the proposition that voters support 
bonds in which they can see a personal benefit and may 
not support them if they do not see a personal benefit. 
An editorial in the Westerly Sun (October 30, 2014) 
written just before the election noted this tendency in 
Rhode Island:
 However, even though the last zoo bond easily 
passed eight years ago, the record has shown that 
standalone projects are more vulnerable to voter 
rejection than bonds that cast a wider net. In the 
last 10 general elections since 1994, the voters 
have approved 41 of the 52 bond issues….Those 
that have failed were most often individual build-
ings or projects like the 2000 election’s Heritage 
Harbor Museum bonds for Providence. The last 
Table 4: Maine and Rhode Island Statewide  
 Bond Referenda Outcomes by Type, 
 1990–2014
Bond type Number
Won–lost 
(%)
Mean 
percentage 
of vote
Natural resources
Maine 34 28–6    (82.4) 58.4
Rhode Island 15 13–2    (86.7) 64.6
Total 49 41–8   (83.7) 60.3
Transportation
Maine 18 15–3    (80.0) 63.3
Rhode Island 13 13–0  (100.0) 64.6
Total 31 28–3  (90.3) 63.9
Education 
Maine 20 16–4    (80.0) 55.4
Rhode Island 15 15–0  (100.0) 59.6
Total 35 31–4    (88.6) 57.2
Economic development
Maine 18 16–2    (88.9) 55.3
Rhode Island 5 3–2    (60.0) 52.4
Total 23 19–4    (82.6) 54.9
Arts/historical
Rhode Island 8 3–5    (37.5) 46.8
State facilities
Maine 5 1–4    (20.0) 41.1
Rhode Island 8 3–5    (37.5) 49.8
Total 11 4–9    (30.8) 47.5
Health 
Maine 6 6–0  (100.0) 57.8
Rhode Island 1 1–0  (100.0) 66.0
Total 7 7–0  (100.0) 58.1
Public housing*
Rhode Island 3 3–0  (100.0) 56.3
Agriculture 
Maine 2 2–0  (100.0) 59.1
*  The public housing category includes one bond  
referendum in Rhode Island, which would have 
supported funding for both public housing and  
state land acquisition. 
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bond to be voted down in Rhode Island was in 
2006, $4 million for renovations at Fort Adams 
State Park. 
Presumably, what most voters want out of transpor-
tation bonds is better roads that they can use. Voters 
may not see transportation projects intended chiefly for 
business use or facilities for the state transportation 
department as directly beneficial to them. All three 
transportation bonds that failed in Maine since 1990 
were these sorts of bonds. The losing bonds (in November 
1992 and 1994) dealt with matters such as port facilities 
(rejected twice), removing oil tanks and building salt 
and sand facilities for the Maine Department of 
Transportation, and restoring freight rail service in three 
Maine counties. Some of these bonds also had other 
obstacles. The failed 1994 bond, at $21.3 million, was 
the most expensive on the ballot. The two transporta-
tion bonds that failed in 1992, however, were the two 
cheapest bonds on the ballot out of six, while the most 
expensive (a $42 million bond issue “to create and 
protect jobs through capital improvements in transpor-
tation facilities”) passed. The single worst bond issue 
performance at the ballot box in either state was the 
1992 transportation bond to repair and improve munic-
ipal port facilities, with barely one voter in four (25.4 
percent) backing it. Of course, the early 1990s were an 
exceptionally difficult time to get any bonds passed in 
Rhode Island or Maine. Transportation bonds normally 
win, but particularly if they offer motorists the promise 
of better roads. 
Even with roads, however, when voters perceive a 
measure as benefitting only one relatively sparsely 
populated part of the state, the bond can fail. An 
example from the late 1960s and early 1970s is instruc-
tive. Two measures designed to improve Maine Route 6, 
a two-lane state highway that stretches across Maine 
from Vanceboro to the Quebec border north of Jackman, 
failed. According to the Milo Town Crier (August 31, 
1967), supporters hoped that an upgraded Route 6 
would attract international through-traffic from Canada 
and spur economic development along its corridor. In a 
letter to the editor of the same paper, Ronald “Tinker” 
Richards (Town Crier, August 31, 1967) anticipated 
the opposition a project directly benefitting only part of 
the state can receive. His directed his critique at the 
Maine State Jaycees, who voted to support all of the 
1967 bond referenda except the one for Route 6, which 
travels through Milo, but his plea is one that could be 
echoed by many other referenda with a local benefit: 
 As an ex-President of the Milo Jaycees, I would 
like to apologize for the action of the State 
Jaycees who voted to support all questions 
on the up-coming referendum except the one 
concerning the repair of Route 6. The majority 
of the State Jaycee membership is consolidated 
in Southern and urban areas of the state…. It 
would seem that they are not interested in the 
improvement of any part of the state other than 
their own.…It is a shame if the Maine Jaycees 
begrudge the central area of the state $3,000,000 
for “improving hazardous conditions on Route 
6” which cuts from east to west right through 
the center of the state….This particular area 
needs the boost that a good highway would 
provide. In this state we have got to learn to 
share. If only those with children in school voted 
for money for education, if only those who fly 
voted for airport money, if only Bangor resi-
dents voted money for the retarded center and 
only Lewiston-Auburn voted for their bridge, 
it is highly unlikely that anybody would get 
anything. I wonder if the Maine Jaycees have 
thought about that. 
The 1967 referendum, which would have spent $3 
million on improvements to Route 6, failed, getting 
The November 2016 election brought many changes 
to Maine—legalization of marijuana, ranked-choice 
voting, Maine’s first electoral vote split since it 
adopted the district plan in 1969, and the first 
Republican electoral vote from the Pine Tree state 
since 1988. One thing did not change, however: 
a transportation bond referendum won in a land-
slide. Issue 6 was the only bond issue on Maine’s 
2016 ballot, and it called for $100 million to support 
transportation in the state. As usual, no major orga-
nized opposition arose for the transportation bond, 
unlike most initiative proposals on the ballot. The 
bond referendum outperformed all five initiatives, 
receiving 61.2 percent of the vote and carrying all 
16 Maine counties. Even Piscataquis County, which 
voted “no” on all five initiatives, gave Issue 6 a 
slender victory with 51 percent of the vote. Looking 
down the road, there’s no reason to expect that 
Maine voters will put up a stop sign anytime soon in 
transportation bond votes.3 
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only 44.1 percent of the vote. Three years later, backers 
of a $30 million proposal for Route 6 experienced one 
of the worst electoral defeats in Maine bond history 
when the bond garnered only 28.5 percent of the vote.2 
In the same era, bonds for other narrowly defined trans-
portation projects also failed: bridge and causeways for 
Chebeague Island (1963), dock facilities on Matinicus 
Island (1969), airport improvements at the Auburn-
Lewiston and Oxford County airports (1972), and a 
proposed toll bridge between Waterville and Winslow 
(1972). A bridge project connecting Lewiston and 
Auburn lost in both 1951 and 1967, before finally 
passing in 1968 (http://legislature.maine.gov/9198/). 
Since 1972, most transportation bonds have funded 
projects statewide and have had a high degree of success. 
Effect of Ballot Positions 
I coded each bond according to where it appeared on 
the list of bonds—which is not necessarily the number it 
appeared under on the ballot. For example, the first bond 
listed on the ballot might come after three initiatives and 
be known as Issue 4, but, it is coded here as position “1” 
because that is where it is on the bond list. Table 5 exam-
ines the won–lost record and winning percentage of bond 
referenda by ballot position in both states. 
The first three ballot positions are relatively similar 
in voter support. Additional choices generally and grad-
ually lose a small amount of success and vote share as 
voters go down the ballot. However, these data do not 
show a clear cut-off point after which voter support 
drops sharply. Muir and Schneider (1999) argued that 
the more statewide bonds voters have to choose from, 
the lower the chance that any of them would win, and 
the findings from my analysis are consistent with that. 
However, it is possible for bonds to win from any posi-
tion on the ballot relative to other bonds, even in a 
crowded field. In 2004, when Rhode Island voters faced 
choices on 12 bonds, they approved all but two of them. 
On the other hand, there were cases in which the lone 
bond referendum on the ballot lost. It is not clear that 
voters are more cautious about voting for referenda 
simply because there are a high number of them. 
Narrowly Focused Bonds 
As we have seen, voters 
look skeptically on bonds that 
seem to benefit only one narrow 
place or interest. The story of 
Issue 4 in Maine’s 2014 election 
(which won 62.7 percent of the 
vote) shows, however, that it is 
possible to win a statewide 
bond referendum that directly 
benefits only one location if the 
backers of the referendum can 
show how it will benefit others.
Issue 4 asked the following: 
“Do you favor a $10,000,000 
bond issue, to be awarded 
through a competitive process 
and to be matched by 
$11,000,000 in private and 
other funds, to build a research 
center and to discover genetic 
solutions for cancer and the 
diseases of aging, to promote 
job growth and private sector 
investment in this State, to 
attract and retain young profes-
sionals and make the State a 
Table 5: Bond Ballot Position in Maine and Rhode Island,  
 1990–2014, with Winning Percentage and Average  
 Vote Share
Position 
among 
bonds
Won–lost and winning percentage (%)
Average percentage  
of vote
Maine
Rhode 
Island Total Maine
Rhode 
Island
1 25–3  (89.3) 13–0  (100.0) 38–3  (92.7) 58.4 63.4
2 22–2  (91.7) 11–2    (84.7) 33–4  (89.2) 57.4 61.5
3 15–3  (83.3) 10–2    (83.3) 25–5  (83.3) 60.5 58.6
4 12–2  (85.7) 4–5    (44.4) 16–7  (69.6) 57.3 53.3
5 4–5  (44.4) 6–2  (750.0) 10–7  (58.8) 54.9 56.6
6 4–2  (66.7) 3–1  (750.0) 7–3  (70.0) 49.6 59.1
7 2–1  (66.7) 2–1  (100.0) 4–2  (66.7) 55.5 48.6
8 0–1    (0.0) 2–0    (66.7) 2–1  (66.7) 48.9 57.0
9–12* No cases 3–1    (75.0) 3–1  (75.0)  — 52.8
*There was only one year in the data set in which either state had a bond election with 
more than eight bond issues on the ballot: Rhode Island (November 2004), which had 
12. As all of these come from one year, and the number of cases is so small, I have 
combined 9–12 in this table. 
Two-state average, positions 1–5: 58.3 percent of the vote
Two -state average, positions 6–12: 52.8 percent of the vote
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global leader in genomic medicine?” As Issue 4 shows, 
bond proponents in Maine have become more aware of 
the politics of wording proposals more persuasively. 
Compare the Issue 4 of 2014 to the dry (typical for the 
era) wording of the ill-fated Maine Route 6 bond in 
1970: “Shall a bond issue be ratified for the purposes set 
forth in ‘An Act Providing for a Bond Issue in the 
Amount of Thirty Million Dollars to Reconstruct Route 
6,’ passed by the 104th Legislature?” 
The key point is that the direct beneficiary of the 
2014 referendum was a single entity in a single location. 
While the language of the bond mentioned a “competi-
tive process,” it was widely understood that only one 
facility had the ability to compete for this funding: the 
Jackson Laboratory in Bar Harbor (Bell 2014). 
Commentary on the issue generally assumed or explic-
itly stated this (see, for example, Bell 2014; Connors 
2014; Levin 2014). In fact, the chief website advocating 
for Issue 4 was hosted by Jackson Laboratory, featured 
pictures of Jackson Laboratory, and under the category 
of “About Us,” discussed exclusively the work of Jackson 
Laboratory. 
At $10 million, Issue 4 was tied for the most expen-
sive with a bond for protection of drinking water that 
year. Yet, only the drinking water bond did better at the 
polls, with both getting well over 60 percent of the vote. 
The success of Issue 4 shows a path to victory for bonds 
directly benefitting only one location: emphasize how 
the bond will help on matters that voters statewide care 
about (cancer and jobs) more than the specific mechanics 
of the proposal.
CONCLUSIONS
Statewide bond referenda around the country succeed the vast majority of the time. Maine’s rate fits broadly 
into the national figures and is similar to Rhode Island’s, 
with about four out of five bonds passing. Since the 
mid-1990s, Maine and Rhode Island bond referenda 
have enjoyed an even higher rate of success. The era of 
relatively high rates of failure in the early 1990s seems 
to suggest that voter mood and the condition of a state’s 
economy could be as significant as other factors (such as 
the type of project under consideration) in bond success. 
Certain types of bonds, including transportation bonds, 
perform better than bonds for other subjects. More 
often than not, the bonds pass at the polls, and we can 
often tell when they are likely not to do so.  -
ENDNOTES
1 National Council of State Legislatures’ Ballot Measures 
Database is available at http://www.ncsl.org/research 
/elections-and-campaigns/ballot-measures-database 
.aspx
2 Information about the Route 6 referenda can be found 
on the Ballotpedia website: “Maine State Route 6 
Reconstruction, Referendum Question No. 1 (1967).” 
https://ballotpedia.org/Maine_State_Route_6 
_Reconstruction,_Referendum_Question_No._1_(1967) 
3 “Maine State Route 6 Reconstruction, Referendum 
Question No. 1 (1970).” https://ballotpedia.org/Maine 
_State_Route_6_Reconstruction,_Referendum_Question 
_No._1_(1970)  
4 Election results for 2016 drawn from “November 8, 
2016—Referendum Election”, spreadsheet of election 
results from the Maine Department of State. 
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